Our final piece in the symposium on Governing the Feminist Peace is a reply from our authors to the contributions by Nicole, Mohamed, Helen, and Laura.
It is customary to begin such closing essays with an acknowledgement of the thoughtful efforts of the contributors, and fulsome appreciation of the same. We are indeed indebted to Nicole George, Mohamed Sesay, Helen Berents, and Laura Sjoberg for their careful consideration of our book, and truly grateful for their insights. But, beyond gratitude, other emotions surface also: there is a particular joy unique to having one’s work read and understood (especially when trying to convey a precise meaning can feel so much like nailing jelly to a wall); there is curiosity about why our interlocutors landed on the elements they did to draw out and drill down on; and there is excitement about the possibilities into which such focused engagement breathes life.
The ”life” of the WPS agenda was a central theme in our book – not only anchored in the ecosystem concept we used to describe the empirical focus of our investigations, but also in the motif of vitality (paired with failure) that we argue characterises now 25 years of WPS. The question of where WPS “lives” is also a theme of much WPS scholarship, and something the contributors to this forum pick up on as well. The disjuncture between “government WPS” and “civil society WPS”, however crude and overdrawn this distinction may be, is a tension that has run through the agenda since its inception (quite literally: as we discuss in the book, one of the key faultlines in WPS developed in part from the disagreement between women’s civil society actors and those more closely aligned with UN member states regarding the need for, and content of, the second WPS resolution in 2008). Mohamed, Helen, and Nicole all touch on this tension in different and generative ways.
It has often been argued that WPS belongs to civil society, that women’s rights activists have been responsible for nurturing and continuing to care for the agenda. Our ecosystem concept, which draws attention to the multiple and various ways in which the agenda has flourished in different locations, enables interested researchers to look more closely at these forms of engagement and their effects on how WPS is (re)produced. As Helen comments, “the plurality of WPS offers us ways of leveraging the spaces (and the plural is important to the argument of the book) created by feminist advocacy for inclusive peace and security”. Similarly, Nicole’s expertise on women’s rights and gender justice in the Pacific is brought to bear in her critique, in which she reminds us that “no matter the confines of policy, women’s creativity insists and issues practical challenges to those that seek to ‘govern’ the feminist peace through hegemony and exclusion”. These are calls for the continued recognition of the work done by civil society WPS actors, in diverse locations and unevenly distributed resources and access, and we gladly concur.
In his critique, however, Mohamed sounds a note of caution:
“transformative agendas like WPS do not go very far if the neocolonial structures in which they emerged have not been effectively dismantled. … The future of this peace is not merely about how to make these systems more inclusive of women nor how to deploy them to protect and defend women’s rights. The future in this structural setting is about how to decolonize these systems so that violence and war is delegitimized as a means of governance, a question that seems to be deflected by those governing feminist peace”
We discuss the violences of racism and coloniality in relation to WPS throughout Governing the Feminist Peace, but we neither tackle the pressing need for decolonising WPS governance nor examine at length how white supremacy is imbricated with WPS (though the latter is one of our persistent threads). It would take another book to explore the specifically structural relations between neocolonialism and feminist peace projects in Africa, but let us not palm off the challenge. Mohamed seems to suggest that WPS is not only superficial – insofar as it does not in itself transform colonial political economy – but also serves African elites who have “inherited the colonial governance paradigm”. There is of course a long-running critique of WPS as colonial, whether in the relations of saviour and saved embedded in the resolutions, the practices of expertise and tutelage, or the policy representations of a peaceable north and violent south.
Our approach takes up these critiques but follows a different arc, not just because the ecosystem concept resists views of WPS as having any fundamental quality (whether colonial or decolonial) but also because we seek to recover histories that cut against the grain of the global north origin story, a diffusion model ironically shared by liberal advocates and radical critics alike. Whatever the hegemonic forms operative in some times and places (say, the Security Council when Hillary Clinton showed up), the emergence and shape of WPS is also creditable to Namibia and Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, Liberia and Leymah Gbowee, and the Democratic Republic of Congo and Denis Mukwege. For Nandi-Ndaitwah that meant a veteran of the liberation struggle joining the postcolonial condition to gender equality and peacekeeping in the prototype to Resolution 1325; for Gbowee a grassroots women’s movement dethroning Charles Taylor; for Mukwege a model of care for survivors of sexual violence. All could be seen as figures of elite or liberal politics: Nandi-Ndaitwah is Namibia’s next president and was a minister for decades before that; Gbowee became a figurehead for peacemaker discourse and won the Nobel Prize; Mukwege is the exception that proves the rule in figurations of global south perpetrator masculinity. Yet we would also see in each case contestations of colonial governance: a postcolonial WPS born of anti-apartheid resistance; a popular resistance to extractive war economies; a rebuff to western saviour roles.
Whether these figures in their fraught particularity ultimately resolve for or against neocolonialism is a question we cannot decide here, partly because the discrete function of ‘WPS’ in any given setting is open to contestation, and we argue more open that most observers have realised or comparisons with other governance projects would allow. Even in the DR Congo, where the fixation on sexual violence and the reinforcement of racialized scripts has been most gratuitous, women in the east continue to organise with 1325 as a tool. We suggest this is not only because they have their own independent concern with preventing and responding to sexual violence not reducible to a colonial narrative, but also because they take up the themes in the agenda that foreground agency, peacemaking and reparation. That they may do so tactically, and highly cognisant of western humanitarian logics, can be understood in the same frame as a genuine openness and collaborative making in WPS itself. For the regional and international actors who so profit from violence and war in the region, the mobilisation is unlikely to be a welcome one. If we make ‘governance’ synonymous with ‘elite rule’ these possibilities disappear. The more fascinating stories are in the forgotten elements, the tenacious survival of forms of WPS that did not resonate with the hegemonic forms, and in that which is excluded, and some of those we have tried to tell.
Helen pushes us (always with care) to reflect on what is next for feminist peace, in the shape of WPS or otherwise. She asks: “How do more recent calls towards abolitionist notions of feminist peace (Wright and Achilleos-Sarll 2024), or the articulation of Indigenous knowledge as non-co-optable by feminist governance (Russ-Smith 2022), for example, disrupt or exceed the accounts of WPS within the book?” Nicole likewise wonders “if the story of hegemony and exclusion that Kirby and Shepherd draw out in their WPS analysis is simply an inevitable reality”. Let us take the opportunity to emphasise a point that is not clear enough in the book. WPS is but one manifestation of ‘feminist peace’, a much wider field of possibilities that both feeds and generates resistance to the agenda as practiced. It is not our intention to simply expand WPS to swallow all feminist peace practice, nor to plead for WPS governance by adding new adjectives and sub-branches. Ecology does not imply endless metastasis. We do discuss indigenous contentions of the agenda, especially in the case of liberal Canadian WPS, and expect that indigenous knowledge, which is after all not singular, can in principle be accommodated to some WPS niches, though only after a reckoning with settler colonialism that is politically impossible at present. (Indeed, one of the points we emphasise is that indigenous politics should not be read only through the lens of marginalised women or excluded knowledges but as sovereign and counter-sovereign practices). Abolitionism is to us more inimical still to WPS as governance, and we are not sure that there could be anything recognisably WPS without governance. Though we cannot do justice to debates within abolitionism here, it will suffice to say that only those variants that seek institutional reform (e.g. fewer police officers but more social service) can be compatible with the state that remains the main locus for appeal in the agenda. An ecological perspective allows for the enumeration of these points of contact and resistance at great length: it is our hope that the model might serve to better map grafting, subdivision and repulsion.
We conclude our reflections with the prompt set by Laura in her generous engagement with our work, as it is a question that resonates with us – still, even now, having written many thousands of words over many years on this topic: “does this policy ecosystem, even when we ‘forget’ its singularity, still have (too many) limits?” Perhaps unsurprisingly, our answer is yes, and no. The agenda is, in a sense, unbounded – curtailed only by the political imagination of those who act in its name, who write policy that invokes WPS, who enact WPS and thus bring the agenda into being. We locate that openness not just in the coordinates of actors ranging from local women’s groups to great power foreign ministries but also in the sprawl of ‘gender equality’ itself: an emancipatory horizon that implicates every arena of life and every level of analysis. And yet the limits are evident, and inevitable, even when the agenda is revealed as fluid and multiple, in all its kaleidoscopic complexity. The agenda is, after all, partly arrested in governance, and governance is limited by the structures of power that sustain it. Contemporary national and global governance systems rely on and reproduce structures of power, both ideational and material, that work to impose limits and foreclose liberation. In this way, WPS is a case: an example of a sprawling and diverse policy agenda that is both a product of, and challenge to, its context – and which necessarily exists in relation, through multiple connections to the political movements that both motivate and test it. As we note in the conclusion to the book, our work situates WPS “as always entangled in a web of feminist contentions over everything from sexuality to carcerality. The analytical move is paradoxical, since it is precisely by forgetting a pristine WPS that the myriad connections to contemporary feminist movements become visible again”. Rendering feminists visible in the governance of feminist peace and putting politics and power at the centre of our analysis, was at the heart of our project, and simultaneously formed the conditions of our work. So when deliberating the limits of WPS, we question not only the policy ecosystem, but the limits of governance, the limits of feminism – the limits of peace.











